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Approved For Release 2004/06/29: CIA-RDP61S00750A000600150024-2

27 January 1960

MEMORANDIM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

: Operational ICEM Sites

1. Although Mr. Khrushchev claims that the Soviet Union has missiles that can hit a target any place in the world with a

muclear warhead,

although we estimate that

the Soviet Union now has an initial operational capability to fire these missiles against targets in the US, we do not know the location of a single operational site from which the Soviet Union is prepared to fire these missiles. This means:

- a. We do not actually know if there is any substance in Mr. Khrushchev's boasts at the present time.
- b. If the Soviet Union does have an initial operational espability to fire missiles against the UE we do not know the number of missiles now ready, the rate at which missiles are being added to this capability, or whether the Soviet's operational concept involves hard sites, soft sites, a partially mobile system or an all mobile system.
- c. In spite of the great power of the Strategic Air Command, SAC has no means of protecting the US against Soviet

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ICRMs because we are unable to provide them with the necessary target information concerning these wespons.


- 2. Although the Soviets claim that the world power balance has shifted, and we are entering into a critical period of negotiation in which relative power will have considerable weight, we are unable to provide the President and the Secretary of State with the hard facts about Soviet ICBMs to support our evaluation of the true Soviet power position. This cannot help but harm their ability to carry forward these negotiations.
- 3. The problem of ICHM deployment has had a top priority in the intelligence community for over a year. The Critical Collection Problems Committee has devoted great effort to the problem. A wide range of collection systems have been considered and all of any likely value have been tried or are now being carried forward.

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4. Another major recommendation of the CCPC, also endorsed by the USIB, was to employ the CHALICE program vigorously in an

	there have been two CHALICE missions. Although both missions turned up a great deal of useful information, particularly that relating to Soviet defenses against SAC, neither mission revealed an operational ICEM launch site 5. The intelligence community obviously will continue to push for information on this problem through all likely avenues of
25X1 25X1	attack and some useful information may be collected.
23/()	in general, two prospective sources of serial photography, the CHALICE program and various satellite systems. The photography produced by
	the satellite systems 25X
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25X1	The CHALICE progrem is the only system likely to produce

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missions recommended	by the Ad Hoc Requirements	Committee at the	
present time are des	igned to cover part of the	search area selected	
as well as those are	es for which there is any s	hred of suspicious	
information.			
2.1.1. 4.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.			
		CHALICE missions will	
give us information	on the location or absence		
give us information The CHALICE missions			7
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	10.	In	view	of	the	B 11	ine!	tion	desc	ribed	i el	ove,	it	is	recome	aded
that	we	seek	perm	issi	on	for	an	expe	soded.	use	of	the	CHAI	LICE	system	
on a	moe	t ur	gent	basi	в.											

ROBERT AMORY, JR.
Chairman,
Critical Collection Problems Committee